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SYNGE V. SYNGE!

The defendant agreed by ante-nuptial written promise to leave a certain house and land, by will, to the plaintiff for life, if she would marry
him. The marriage took place~but sometime afterward he conveyed the
property to third parties.
In an action for damages for breach of contract the court held that the
conveyance by the husband was a breach of contract for which the wife
had an immediate right of action and could recover damages.
CONTRACTS

TO MAKE WILLS.

The law is in a somewhat unsettled state with regard to
joint and mutual wills and contracts to make wills. The
point most difficult to overcome is the irrevocable quality of
such instruments, for one of the chief features of a will is its
ambulatory character.
The case of Dufour v. Preira,I Dick. 419, decided in 1769,
is one of the oldest cases on this subject arid one of those most
frequently cited as establishing the validity of mutual wills.
Husband and wife had made a mutual will, and on the death
of the husband it wis proved as his will, the wife taking the
benefits it conferred on her. Before her death she made
another will which if carried into effect would revoke the
mutual will. The question to be decided was whether her
second will should be admitted to probate or declared void.
The court decided that the wife could not revoke the mutual
1 Reported in i Q. B. 466 (1894).
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will after the death of the husband, Lord Camden saying.
"It might have been revoked by both jointly; it might have
been revoked separately, provided the party intending it had
given notice to the other of such revocation. But I cannot be
of opinion that either of them, could, during their joint lives,
do it secretly or that after the death of either, it could be
done by the survivor by another will. It is a contract between
the parties which cannot be rescinded, but by the consent of
both."
In 1797, Walpole v. 01ford, 3 Ves. 402, was decided.
George, Earl of Orford, in 1752, made a will in favor of the
defendants; but in 1756 he and Lord Walpole each made a
will (a reciprocal sacrifice of female issue) in favor of the collateral heirs, male, in order to preserve the family estates in
the name of Walpole. Lord W. died in 1757, and Earl G. in
1791 ; but in 1776 the latter had made a codicil in which hereferred to his last will as dated November 25, 1752. A bill
was presented, claiming that Earl G. had made a mistake in.
referring to his last will as dated 1752, and that, under the
circumstances, he must have meant 1756; and even though
he did not, he could not revoke his will of 1756 by the codicil
of 1776, because the wills made by him and Lord W. were
mutual wills, in the nature of a compact, and Earl G., having
acquiesced for thirty-five years in the benefits conferred on him
by the will of Lord W., could not revoke his own to the
detriment of the heirs of Lord W.
The two wills were executed at the same time and place,
were drawn by the same solicitor, had the same witnesses,
and were expressed in similar language, and there was other
evidence that they were intended as mutual wills; but Lord'
Loughborough dismissed the bill on the grounds that the
terms of the agreement were not clear, certain, and fair, and
that there was not the degree of evidence required by the
Statute of Frauds.
Lord Hargrave, in his excellent discussion of the case,.
o
2 Hargrave'sJrisconsultExercitations, 7 , disagrees with the.
.decision reached by Lord Loughborough, and thinks the evidence sufficient to establish the instruments as mutual wills..
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He believed that, as Earl G. had taken benefits under the will,
equity as well as good faith and conscience should restrain
him from disappointing its provisions.
In his opinion, there was a binding compact or agreement
which neither party should have been allowed to revoke without giving due notice to the other; otherwise, it would give
license to both to impose on each other at pleasure and gain
undue advantage over the other. His opinion agrees with
that of Lord Camden, in Dufour v. Pereira, and is sanctioned
by the decisions of many courts: Carmichael v. Carmichael,
72 Mich. 76; Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483; Breathittv. Whittdker's Ex'rs, 8 B. Monroe, 530; Bolynan v. Overall, 8o Ala.
457Lord Hargrave states several very early cases in which
actions were brought and sustained for breach of agreement,
in consideration of which certain testamentary dispositions had
been made and gives others in which specific performance had
been decreed. From which cases he infers that compacts and
agreements on the faith of which wills are made, or forborne
to be made, are enforceable at law or in equity; the party
injured by the breach receiving damages or relief in the
nature of specific performance.
The first decision in this country on mutual wills is Izard
v. Middleton, I Desaus, I 15, in 1785. R. and J. had verbally
agreed that if either should die without male issue, he should
bequeath a certain sum to the survivor for the purpose of
keeping up the family name. R. made his will accordingly,
trusting that J. would do the same, but on the death of J. found
that J. had bequeathed his entire estatd to his sister. The
agreement being within the Statute of Frauds a bill for its
specific performance was dismissed. The case is not well
reported, but from the opinion of the court it is usually cited
as sanctioning the validity of mutual wills.
This case was followed, in 181 I, by Rivers v. Ex'rs of Rivers,
3 Desaus, I88, in which the court held that the husband
would be bound by an ante-nuptial agreement to make
adequate provision for the wife in consideration that she
renounce all claims to his estate. The husband made pro-
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vision for her in his will, but the court, considering it inadequate, decreed that it be enlarged, stating that a man may
renounce every benefit or right which the law allows him if
he does so fairly and without fraud, and he will be bound by
his agreement so to do.
Cases in which it has been necessary to consider the force
and validity of mutual wills have arisen in many of the States,
dnd courts have almost always decided in their favor.
The case usually relied on by those claiming adversely to
such instruments is Hobson v. Blackburn, I Add. 277, decided
in 1822. In the course of his opinion, Sir John Nicholl said
of a joint will: "An instrument of this nature is unknown to
the testamentary law of this country, or in other words, it is'
unknown as a will." He thought, however, that it might be
sustained in equity by making the devisees trustees for performing the testator's part of the agreement, but would not
admit it to probate as a will, because it was irrevocable by the
testators. This case is often cited as deciding that joint or
mutual wills are void and cannot be admitted to probate, but
this interpretation of the case is incorrect, for the will had
previously been probated as the will of one of the testators,
and was now asked to be admitted to probate in preference to
a later will by one of the survivors, which revoked his share
of the joint dispositions. This the court refused to do, deciding that joint wills are not irrevocable.
Clayton v. Liverman, 2 Dev. and Bat. 558, was decided on a
misinterpretation of this case. After the death of two sisters,
an instrument executed by them as their last will was
offered for probate, but was refused because it purported to
be a mutual will and was thought by the court to imply
an agreement: z Wmn.'s E'rs, 8 (9 Ed.); but see also pp.
107-109.

As the instrument was an expression by each of the disposition she desired to have made of her propert; after her
death, and as no revocation had been attempted by either
sister, and probate had not been 6ffered until after the death
of both, it is difficult to see why it should not have been
admitted either as a mutual will or as the separate will of each:
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Rcdfield's Law and Practice of Surrogate Courts, 129; Betts v.
Harer,39 Ohio, 639.
The reasoning of the court in the case of Exparte Day,
I Bradf. 416, in which the facts were similar to those in Clayton and Liverman, is far more logical. The court says: "The
subscription at the end of the will, the declaration of its testamentary character, and the attestation by two witnesses, if
proved, are none the less true of each of the testators, because
true of both," and "Because the will happens to be made in
conformity to some agreement, or contains on its face matters
of agreement, or shows mutuality of testamentar, intention
between two persons, and a compact or intention not to revoke,
in my judgment it is none the less a will."
Where an agreement has been entered into to make a will
of a certain tenor for a valuable consideration, as for services
to be performed, and the promisee has fulfilled his part of the
agreement, it is but just that the agreement should be enforced
even though it is necessary to hold the first will irrevocable by
a later will of the promisor. In many cases the contract has
been that the promisor will bequeath his property to the promisee, in consideration that the promisee maintain him and give
him a home for the remainder of his life. Though such agreements have been entered into verbally, and legatees under
a second will have tried to justify their claims under the Statute of Frauds, if the contract is fair, just and reasonable, and
the promisee has executed his part of the agreement, a court of
equity will enforce the contract regardless of the Statute.
Bohnan v. Overall, 8o Ala. 451 ; Wall v. Scales, 4 7 N. C. 472.
In Gould v. M17ansfield, however, the couh decided that an
oral agreement between two sisters, that each should make
a will devising to the other all of her property, is a contract for
the sale of lands, and therefore within the Statute, though it
was shown that the surviving sister, who asked for the specific
performance of the agreement, had performed services and expended money in the belief that the intestate had made a will
in accordance with the agreement. As before stated, it is on
the Statute of Frauds that the decisions in Walpole v. Orford
and Izard v. lfiddleton partly rest.
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One may renounce his right to dispose of his property at
pleasure, and bind himself by contract to dispose of it by will
to certain persons, and such contract will be enforced, not by
setting aside the will, but by making the executor, heir or
devisee, trustee to perform the contract: Goilmnere v. Battion,
i Vern. 48; Johnson v.tHubbell, io N. J. Eq. 332; Maddoxv.
Rowe, 23 Ga. 431; Bolman v. Overall, 8o Ala. 451,; Van
Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N. J. Eq. 142; Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76; Bird'v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483; Emery v.
Darling, 73 N. E. 715; Smith v. Pierce, 65 Vt. 200; Wright
v. Wright, 23 L. R. A. 196; 3 Parsons on Contracts,4o6,407.
In Tuit v. Smith, 137 Pa. 35, the plaintiff brought an action
of ejectment claiming, under a deed dated 1885, from S., given
in consideration that he support her. The defendant put in
evidence a testamentary writing, dated 1884, in which S. stated
that The bequeathed all of her property to the defendant for his
kindness and care of her during her natural life, and also that
he was to take possession of the house and take her into his
family as a member thereof. The defendant acted in accordance with this agreement, but S. left the house within a year
without cause. Held, that there was nothing to justify a recision of the contract, and ejectment was not granted.
Where a party has agreed to adopt a child and make him
heir, and the party dies intestate, it often happens that heirs of
the intestate will attempt to defeat the claims of the adopted
child. In a case recently decided (1894), Wright v. Wright,
23 L. R. A. 196, the defendant was taken by W. and wife
with the intention of adopting him as their son, the agreement
being that he should become their heir and come into possession of their property. The defendant supposed he was the
son of W., and faithfully performed his duties to his adopted
parents, giving his entire time to them without remuneration.
On the death of W., the -defendant being then -twenty-two
years of age, learned of his adoption, and that the statute
under which he had been adopted was unconstitutional.
W. having died intestate, his heirs claimed his property, but
the court, held that as there had been a contract, that the
defendant should have the property of which W. might die
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seized, and as there had been such performance on the part
of the defendant as to take the case out of the Statute of
Frauds, "equity should enforce this understanding despite
the law," and the title and estate should vest in the defendant
the same as if he had been the son: Van Dzyne v. Vreeland,
12 N. J.JEq. 142; Sharkey v. McDermot, 91 Mo. 647; Healy
v. Simpson, 113 Mo. 340.
In the cases thus far considered, the remedy for breach of
contract to make a will in favor of a certain person or persons,
was sought after the death of one of the contracting parties
when his will was offered for probate, and its provisions were
n6t consistent with the contract, or when having died intestate, heirs claimed the property in opposition to the contract;
but in Synge v. Synge (1894), I Q. B. 466, an action for
breach of damages was brought during the life of both contracting parties.
The defendant before marriage agreed, by letter, as an
inducement thereto, to leave to the plaintiff by will a certain
house and land for life. The marriage took place, but sometime afterward the defendant conveyed his entire estate to
third parties. The plaintiff claimed a life estate in the
property, commencing on her husband's death, and that the
conveyance was subject thereto, or in the alternative, claimed
damages for breach of contract.
Four questions were considered by the court. First."Was
there a binding contract?'" This was decided in the affirmative, Kay, L J., express:ng his opinion that the proposal of
terms was made as an in'!ucement to the lady to marry, and
that she married the def-:ndant on the faith. that he would
keep his word.
Sceand. "Was there such a contract as could be enforced
in equity, or was there a remedy in damages for the breach
of it?" The decision on this point w-as that, marriage being
a valuable consideration, .nd the contract being in writing so
that no question on the !tatute of Frauds could arise, equity
would give effect to the proposal, or the plaintiff could recover
damages for its breach: IJanzerslty v. De Bil, 12 C1. and F.
4 :, at 78. See, also, W?1,7 v. Scales, 47 W. C. 472-
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Third. "Has the time arrived at which such remedy can be
asserted?"
The court said that, as the plaintiff asked for
damages for breach of contract, and as by the conveyance the
defendant had put it out of his power to perform his part of the
contract, the plaintiff could maintain an action for its breach at
once, and need not be delayed until the time set for the performance of the contract: Hockster v. De La Tour, 22 L. J.
(Q. B.) 455; Frost v. Knigizt, Law Rep. 7 Ex. III; Short v.
Stone, 8 Q. B. 358; Ford v. Tiley, 6 B. and C. 325.
Fourth. "If remedy be by way of damages, what amount of
damages should be given?" The answer to this was that
"the amount must depend on the value of the possible life
estate which plaintiff would be entitled to if she survived her
husband."
This decision certainly is reasonable, for it would be unjust
to allow the defendant to convey the property to third parties, regardless of his obligations under the contract into
which he entered.
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